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In the wake of the global financial meltdown and the great re-cession, more people than ever believe that economics needs fresh thinking that refuses to take the “givens” of capitalist 
theory for granted, yet affirms what works well in free market 
economies while addressing what does not. Luigino Bruni is an 
Italian historian of economics who shows the social and cultural 
context of all economic activity, and throws on economics a lens 
shaped by Catholic social thought. The result is an intriguing work 
of rethinking—the kind of work that is urgently needed if we are 
to address the social, environmental, and economic challenges fac-
ing the world.
Bruni begins by asserting that there is a great illusion behind 
much of global economy: an illusion that “the market . . . could 
offer a painless and peaceful society” (xxi) by means of reducing 
human interaction to the transactions that take place in anonymous 
markets. It is taken for granted that the road to human “happiness” 
lies in organizing life around markets. Yet that premise misses (and 
ultimately undermines) the central importance of human relation-
ships and leads to “the bleak and lonely drift of modern market 
societies” (xxi). Bruni wants to affirm relatively free markets, but 
do it by placing them in the larger context of, and operate them for 
the benefit of, the inherently relational character of human life, in-
cluding acknowledging the risks—the “wounds”—that come with 
those relationships. He traces the development of social thought 
from the Hebraic view that relationships do involve risk, but joy 
and depth in life cannot be found without this struggle, through 
Plato and Aristotle to the gradual emergence of a Modernism in 
which the basis for common life came to be seen as fear rather 
than love. According to Bruni, Adam Smith saw the market as a 
mechanism to free individuals from needing relational networks 
to help support them—the gratuitous granting of aid that family 
and friendships provide could be dispensed with for much of life 
(16). This dispensing with relationships gives an illusion of indi-
vidual freedom, but at the price of diminishing personal meaning 
and eroding family and community life.
Most importantly for Americans, Bruni’s argument ignores 
(and transcends) more American ways of framing these issues, and 
lays bare the “traps” in both free market (largely Republican) and 
social equity (largely Democratic) approaches. On the one hand, 
he makes clear why an untrammeled free market ends up under-
mining family life and “family values,” and on the other hand he 
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cites research that shows how “Aid without neighborliness, even 
with the best of intentions, can strengthen the traps of depen-
dency and welfarism” (23). In other words, both ends of the politi-
cal policy debates in the United States have been framed within 
the Modern construct of anonymous transactions, and both have 
led to the thinning of the relational networks that support the full 
flourishing of human life.
Bruni suggests that economics needs to be re-thought by tak-
ing into account the basis for human flourishing that is summed 
up in the word “gratuitousness.” He argues that this is the literal 
basis of life—every child is given life gratuitously, and nothing “is 
of greater value than an act of gratuitousness (given or received), 
and nothing causes greater spiritual pain than gratuitousness be-
trayed” (45). He goes on to state that the thesis of the book is “to 
reclaim the value, including the economic value, of a more fully 
dimensioned relationality, open to the contract but also to the en-
counter with the other inspired by gift” (45). Bruni argues that de-
spite all attempts to remove “gratuitousness” from market life, it is 
impossible and would destroy it, because it would destroy the trust 
that is the relational glue that keeps markets working. He then 
examines the various forms of love, and argues that there are paral-
lels in economics for each form, beginning with eros as the driving 
force of the contract, in which each “tries to fulfill itself through 
the other” (47), and the center of which is the “I.” The result is an 
“economic narcissism” stripped of real encounter.
The eros of the market needs philia in the companies that en-
gage in the market—philia in which gratuitous relations of trust 
can be built. Without it, staff cannot move beyond the bare stipu-
lations of contract, and so cannot succeed in “going above and be-
yond” to real success—even defined as monetary success. Along 
with this is the role of agape as defined by St. Paul, which includes 
being with and simply receiving (listening, accepting) the other as 
beloved other. Only when all three aspects of love are engaged is 
a fully human life possible. Economically, Bruni sees this more in 
cooperatives or associations structured to involve equality and par-
ticipation—but for philia to be effective it must be “a relationship 
of choice” (56). That would rule out the coercive collectives of com-
munism. He sees contract economics as driven primarily by a nar-
cissistic eros on the one hand, and civil society as left to the work 
of philanthropy, and philia, on the other. But these are inadequate, 
and both need the dimension offered by agape—the purely gratu-
itous love that offers itself freely for others. Agape can rehumanize 
the market, and when philia leads too far into “communitarianism” 
that swallows the individual, it is the prophetic voice of agape that 
can pull it back toward more human relations (59).
But how to build these ideas into economics? Here Bruni 
reaches for the Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity—the principle 
that human activity should take place at the “lowest” level possible, 
and “higher” levels of government and organization should get 
involved only to do what lower levels (family and neighborhood 
and town) cannot. On these lines, contractual economics should 
be nested in a new framing of subsidiarity: “let not the contract do 
what friendship can do; let now friendship do what love can do. 
The contract remains potentially a positive and civilizing relation-
ship, but it must always be seen as subsidiary to philia and agape, 
and not as a form of relationship that can be substituted for the 
other two at a lower price” (60). Bruni cites microcredit as provid-
ing successful examples of this. He also points out that market 
economics “orders subsidiarity exactly the opposite: let not love 
do what the market can do” (60). This latter practice has deeply 
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undercut the role and power of love and confined it to private life, 
where it is eroded further by the stress economic life puts on the 
family.
At this point (chapter 5), Bruni draws on the work of Antonio 
Genovesi, whose work on “civil economy” took place roughly the 
same time as Adam Smith’s. Genovesi was interested in what in 
Scottish tradition was known as the natural virtue of friendliness, 
and insisted that “Man is by nature a social animal.” (65) Accord-
ingly, he viewed markets as “relationships of mutual assistance, 
thus neither impersonal nor anonymous” (66), and as founded on 
public trust, which is “the true precondition of economic develop-
ment” and means that “confidence is the soul of commerce.” Bruni 
goes on to cite research that shows that relationality is integral to 
human flourishing, and recognition of this reality is an essential 
ingredient to creation of a “new ‘economics of well-being’ ” (72). 
He believes that neoclassical economic theory fails to take this 
into account. There is no room for “relational goods” because these 
emerge from non-instrumental motivations, while neoclassical 
theory “treats goods as means, never as ends in themselves” (84). 
The methodology “sees only individuals who choose” and ends up 
with “methodological narcissism” (84). This ends up crowding out 
real relationships. Bruni gives an example of what has happened 
in music: until relatively recently, music could only be heard in a 
community context, but technology and marketization have made 
it possible to hear music completely alone. Because recorded music 
is greatly cheaper monetarily than participation in music as a so-
cial event, it has eroded the latter. This kind of erosion is taking 
place in every aspect of life, so that “we only need look closely at 
our existence to see just how much authentic and meaningful rela-
tionships are being impoverished” (97).
In his final chapter Bruni references the Catholic doctrine of 
charisms—of gifts of grace—as providing a different lens with 
which to view economics, “of seeing things others do not” (99). 
What those with a charism can see is the gift and blessing that lies 
in the challenge or threat posed by interaction with others. In eco-
nomics he points to “the many men and women who committed 
themselves to create the trade unions, the founders of savings and 
loans, rural banks, and cooperatives, which continue to turn prob-
lems into resources and opportunities” (99–100). Those who have 
contributed the most to improving civil society all had charisms to 
see “in the poor, the destitute, the . . . sick, and even the deformed 
something great and beautiful” (102). These gifted people were all 
ultimately community builders who were “in love.” They were able 
to help needy people precisely because they found them “attractive, 
beautiful, and loveable” and were able to convey that to those who 
needed help. They see wealth in the poor, and help them to see it 
too, and so are more effective.
Where does this analysis leave us? Bruni ends by arguing that 
we need to reject “the major dichotomies of modernity: economy/
society, gift/contract, eros/agape” (110). We need to expand pub-
lic interaction, not diminish it for private space. We must restore 
“fraternity” to “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” which has been 
squeezed out by modern economics. How we are to do these things 
he does not say.
I think that Bruni has provided an analysis of what has gone 
missing from modern life in capitalist societies that is insightful 
and helpful. His argument that economics must be re-thought 
to take into account the more basic necessity of healthy relation-
ality is right—though it should have included healthy relation-
ships with the rest of creation, and not just human relationships. 
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Still, his suggestion that the ancient tradition of advancing society 
through movements created by people with charisms—people like 
Muhammad Yunis—is intriguing. It also dovetails with an emerg-
ing movement to upend the Modern trend to professionalize and 
commodify every area of life, and to see people, especially low-
income and others with major challenges, as problems for the state 
to fix or take care of. The emerging trend is to insist that every in-
dividual, however challenged, is gifted and has something to offer 
others, and that human flourishing depends on cultivating human 
life in just this way. Called “ABCD” or “asset-based community 
development,” this movement likewise rejects the dichotomies of 
Modernity, and also rejects the ways both Republicans and Demo-
crats have framed social policy choices, because both have been 
trapped in the narrow box of Modern individualism. Bruni’s work 
is a contribution to this emerging movement to re-think not only 
economics, but more deeply, how we understand human beings 
and our need for a common life with relational density in order to 
flourish.
